But when it came time today for Barack Obama to fulfill that fundamental duty, he failed. The very first reporter [from Fuji TV] called on at the joint press conference with PBO and Japanese PM Hatoyama in Tokyo today put the question to Pres. Obama in blunt and explicit terms:

 

JAPANESE REPORTER: What is your understanding of the historical meaning of the A-bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Do you think it was the right decision?

Obama took a deep breath, paused . . . and punted.

 

 

 

 

Quite the embarrassment. How can you not, tactfully, explain that yes, it was the right thing as it likely saved millions? :idunno:

 

 

Link

What would you have liked him to say . . .

 

Well yes, the killing of millions of innocent lives through the use of the Atomic bomb was absolutely the right thing to. By killing all of those Japanese men, women, and children we were able to show Russia our nuclear capability and that we were not afraid to use them.

What would you have liked him to say . . .

 

Well yes, the killing of millions of innocent lives through the use of the Atomic bomb was absolutely the right thing to. By killing all of those Japanese men, women, and children we were able to show Russia our nuclear capability and that we were not afraid to use them.

Do you honestly think that is why we dropped it?

What would you have liked him to say . . .

 

Well yes, the killing of millions of innocent lives through the use of the Atomic bomb was absolutely the right thing to. By killing all of those Japanese men, women, and children we were able to show Russia our nuclear capability and that we were not afraid to use them.

You know he could have tactfully defended our actions. I'm sure you also know that Japan was the aggressors in that war, were told we had the weapon, told we would use it if it didn't stop. We dropped one, they didn't stop, we dropped the second and they finally relented. Instead of pointing out the truth, that it saved many, many more lives than it cost in a horrible war, you choose to look at it as us being the aggressor flexing our military might. Unbelievable! :ohbrother:

Obama totally glossed over the question and didn't defend an action that was necessary on our part. A sign that he's weak on Foreign policy and is in over his head.

Do you honestly think that is why we dropped it?

I know!

I'm as taken back on that as you!!!

I am open to be educated differently from what Centre College's BA in Government led me to believe and U of L's MAT with a minor in history showed me.

 

I am always ready to learn new things.

 

Sincere post.

http://www.cicd.org.au/?category=hiroshima&page=hiroshima-necessary

 

http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27a/047.html

 

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,826546,00.html

http://www.cicd.org.au/?category=hiroshima&page=hiroshima-necessary

 

:laugh: Did Oliver Stone write this article?

:laugh: Did Oliver Stone write this article?

 

Falsehoods??

I am open to be educated differently from what Centre College's BA in Government led me to believe and U of L's MAT with a minor in history showed me.

 

I am always ready to learn new things.

 

Sincere post.

One of the nastiest canards invented by postwar propagandists is that the Bomb was dropped as Japan was trying to surrender. There is no truth to this. In fact, as MAGIC and ULTRA showed, far from surrendering, Japan explicitly rejected surrender, and instead built up its forces in Kyushu for Operation Ketsu-go. Ketsu-go was a defense in depth of the Kyushu beaches whose purpose was to inflict so many casualties that the Americans would blanch and settle for a negotiated peace that would leave the military in a position of dominance over society.

 

By contrast, unconditional surrender, as envisioned by the Allies, was a policy designed to prevent that. It actually involved several concrete policies rejected by Japan -- occupation of the Home Islands, Allied control of the government, elimination of military domination over society and installation of democracy, disarmament, and the loss of territories Japan had won since the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. When Japan rejected "unconditional surrender," it rejected those policies.

 

With this understanding in mind, the meaning of the correspondence between Sato and Togo becomes clear. Sato, in Moscow, watching the troop trains embark for Manchuria, Germany being occupied, and the Allies working on plans for a post-war world, kept urging Tokyo to come up with concrete plans to end the war. Several times he returned to the theme: either Japan accepts some form of unconditional surrender, with the suggested sole proviso that the Emperor be preserved, or it would get nothing. Again and again, Sato demanded to know what the concrete terms were Tokyo had agreed on, and whether the peace program had the support of the military and the government. Togo evaded this in his famous and much-abused telegram of July 17, in which he stressed that the program was the Imperial Will. This was a circumlocution; the actual fact was the Russian initiative did not have the support of the military or the government. On August 2, Togo, in response to one of Sato's telegrams from the Real World, confessed again the lack of agreement on peace terms. Note that even Togo, was still thinking of terms plural. He, like everyone else, had explicitly rejected unconditional surrender, saying:

With regard to unconditional surrender, we are unable to accept it under any circumstances whatsoever

A second canard is also punctured here. A common claim in revisionist propaganda is that the Japanese would have accepted unconditional surrender if the US guaranteed the Throne. But this is answered by Togo's remarks to Sato in response to this proposal from Sato himself, sent on July 22: unconditional surrender with the Throne guaranteed was unacceptable. There it is in black and white. Regardless of individual positions, the leadership was united on holding out for terms. Unfortunately, they could not agree on just what terms to hold out for. And so the dying went on.....

 

As the MAGIC (diplomatic) summaries indicated, no messages indicating any desire for an end to the war were sent out from Tokyo prior to mid-July of 1945. At the same time, ULTRA (military) traffic was showing that Japan was building up its forces on Kyushu for Ketsu-go. The July traffic was especially ominous, for it showed that US planners had vastly underestimated the number and quality of forces on Kyushu. Revisionists avoid mention of the ULTRA data, because of its clear political import: it showed that the Japanese leaders wanted to continue the war. Based on this data, in fact, naval intelligence analysts in the US correctly identified Imperial policy, noting that the fundamental obstacle to peace was the Imperial Army's belief that it could achieve success against an invasion. This assessment was not only presented in the ULTRA summaries, it was also presented in the MAGIC diplomatic summary of July 27. It was this belief that the A-Bomb destroyed.

His response was the tactful one. What conceivable value is there in droning on about the propriety of the decision to stage a nuclear attack? What value is there in being diplomatic about a scourge on both countries' histories. It isn't news but to the most partisan of partisans.

His response was the tactful one. What conceivable value is there in droning on about the propriety of the decision to stage a nuclear attack? What value is there in being diplomatic about a scourge on both countries' histories. It isn't news but to the most partisan of partisans.

 

First off, he gave no response really. Secondly, he should have answered the question with sympathy for the civilian victims as the link said.

One of the nastiest canards invented by postwar propagandists is that the Bomb was dropped as Japan was trying to surrender. There is no truth to this. In fact, as MAGIC and ULTRA showed, far from surrendering, Japan explicitly rejected surrender, and instead built up its forces in Kyushu for Operation Ketsu-go. Ketsu-go was a defense in depth of the Kyushu beaches whose purpose was to inflict so many casualties that the Americans would blanch and settle for a negotiated peace that would leave the military in a position of dominance over society.

 

By contrast, unconditional surrender, as envisioned by the Allies, was a policy designed to prevent that. It actually involved several concrete policies rejected by Japan -- occupation of the Home Islands, Allied control of the government, elimination of military domination over society and installation of democracy, disarmament, and the loss of territories Japan had won since the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. When Japan rejected "unconditional surrender," it rejected those policies.

 

With this understanding in mind, the meaning of the correspondence between Sato and Togo becomes clear. Sato, in Moscow, watching the troop trains embark for Manchuria, Germany being occupied, and the Allies working on plans for a post-war world, kept urging Tokyo to come up with concrete plans to end the war. Several times he returned to the theme: either Japan accepts some form of unconditional surrender, with the suggested sole proviso that the Emperor be preserved, or it would get nothing. Again and again, Sato demanded to know what the concrete terms were Tokyo had agreed on, and whether the peace program had the support of the military and the government. Togo evaded this in his famous and much-abused telegram of July 17, in which he stressed that the program was the Imperial Will. This was a circumlocution; the actual fact was the Russian initiative did not have the support of the military or the government. On August 2, Togo, in response to one of Sato's telegrams from the Real World, confessed again the lack of agreement on peace terms. Note that even Togo, was still thinking of terms plural. He, like everyone else, had explicitly rejected unconditional surrender, saying:

With regard to unconditional surrender, we are unable to accept it under any circumstances whatsoever

A second canard is also punctured here. A common claim in revisionist propaganda is that the Japanese would have accepted unconditional surrender if the US guaranteed the Throne. But this is answered by Togo's remarks to Sato in response to this proposal from Sato himself, sent on July 22: unconditional surrender with the Throne guaranteed was unacceptable. There it is in black and white. Regardless of individual positions, the leadership was united on holding out for terms. Unfortunately, they could not agree on just what terms to hold out for. And so the dying went on.....

 

As the MAGIC (diplomatic) summaries indicated, no messages indicating any desire for an end to the war were sent out from Tokyo prior to mid-July of 1945. At the same time, ULTRA (military) traffic was showing that Japan was building up its forces on Kyushu for Ketsu-go. The July traffic was especially ominous, for it showed that US planners had vastly underestimated the number and quality of forces on Kyushu. Revisionists avoid mention of the ULTRA data, because of its clear political import: it showed that the Japanese leaders wanted to continue the war. Based on this data, in fact, naval intelligence analysts in the US correctly identified Imperial policy, noting that the fundamental obstacle to peace was the Imperial Army's belief that it could achieve success against an invasion. This assessment was not only presented in the ULTRA summaries, it was also presented in the MAGIC diplomatic summary of July 27. It was this belief that the A-Bomb destroyed.

 

While this was a good read on whether or not Japan was about to surrender, it is certainly not an argument about the necessity of either bomb.

While this was a good read on whether or not Japan was about to surrender, it is certainly not an argument about the necessity of either bomb.

:lol: The links you provided made it so clear that the war would have only lasted a few more weeks. Not only wrong, it would have cost more lives in the long run.

While this was a good read on whether or not Japan was about to surrender, it is certainly not an argument about the necessity of either bomb.

 

How about all the American lives that were saved? Not to mention all the Japanese lives saved.

It was a horrible war that the Japanese were willing to fight to the death, as witnessed on Iwo Jima and Okinawa, plus the actions of the Kamikazes.