"WASHINGTON (AP) -- A series of secret U.S. war games in 1999 showed that an invasion and post-war administration of Iraq would require 400,000 troops, nearly three times the number there now.

 

And even then, the games showed, the country still had a chance of dissolving into chaos."

 

This report, declassified in 2004, predicted many of the problems that plague the current U.S. occupation, including:

 

• Fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic lines
  
• Difficulty securing the borders
  
• Enflamed anti-American sentiment in neighboring countries like Iran
  
• Chaos created by rival forces bidding for power
  
• A U.S. backed replacement regime perceived as week or a puppet govt
  
• A lack of good intelligence before the invasion on the viability of opposition parties inside Iraq
  
• Resistance to the lengthy U.S. military occupation necessary to stabilize a fledgling government
  

 

Gee, it appears that our own leaders didn't do even minimal homework before running our military and foreign policy into a ditch. Alex, can I have incompetence for $500?

 

http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/11/04/war.games.ap/index.html

::cricket:: ::cricket::

::cricket:: ::cricket::

If you're looking for crickets, a whole bunch of them are over here:

 

http://www.bluegrasspreps.com/showthread.php?t=106187

 

This ClintonNewsNetwork piece leaves more questions unanswered than it answers. Who were the people doing the "similation"? The article says it was done in "secret", so when did they release the results of their simulation, and who did they release them to? Were the results ever looked at and discussed by administration officials? Why is this just coming out when the information had been out there for years. Also this "game" was played in 1999, 4 years before we went into Iraq. Anyway, the administration used the Pentagon and all the intel they had, rather than the info from "war games simulation" done by unnamed people 4 years earlier. A lot of questions, CNN probably won't bother to get the real story.

Bad news... Just because H linked the CNN headline, doesn't make it a CNN story. It's an AP story. I'm sure you have a cute little name for them when they report facts that don't fit into your email talking points. You might have known all of this if you'd read the article... it also answers a lot of your questions. For example, it came out through a Freedom of Information Act petition from GW University.

 

Here's the Bellsouth version... I guess they have a liberal agenda... :lol:

I knew where it came from, that wasn't one of my questions. You failed to even address any of my questions. And that version is the same, nothing new, looks like you didn't read them.

It was evidently an internal Pentagon war game. They do those quite often, you know, and they're usually classified at least for a while. How am I supposed to know why the outcomes of the simulation weren't considered when the White House planned the invasion of Iraq? Based on revelations of how the Bush White House operates, the results of this simulation were probably brought up for discussion by some unfortunate military officer, who shortly afterward found himself commanding a radar outpost in Antarctica.

 

billyrayjoebob,

 

Given the way the Iraq war has turned out, how can you possibly maintain your steadfast belief in a competent Executive branch?

I can't think of a war that turned out as planned.

I can't think of a war that turned out as planned.

 

Well, here we have pretty strong evidence that an awful lot of the problems that are currently plaguing the U.S. effort were clearly foreseen in war gaming and yet we bumbled right into them. It was almost as if nobody bothered to research the topic while planning the 2003 invasion...

Well, here we have pretty strong evidence that an awful lot of the problems that are currently plaguing the U.S. effort were clearly foreseen in war gaming and yet we bumbled right into them. It was almost as if nobody bothered to research the topic while planning the 2003 invasion...

Do you have link to the declassified documents. The AP story seems pretty vague on details. Anybody familiar with Iraq could have predicted the difficulties cited in the stories. Considering the light casualties suffered in the "hot" war, it seems that 400,000 troops were not needed. I would like to see how the actual document's casualty estimates compare to the actual ones. My guess is that they were much higher, otherwise the AP and CNN would have mentioned them.

Do you have link to the declassified documents. The AP story seems pretty vague on details. Anybody familiar with Iraq could have predicted the difficulties cited in the stories. Considering the light casualties suffered in the "hot" war, it seems that 400,000 troops were not needed. I would like to see how the actual document's casualty estimates compare to the actual ones. My guess is that they were much higher, otherwise the AP and CNN would have mentioned them.

 

 

:thumb: :thumb:

 

 

 

 

 

::cricket:: ::cricket::

I can't think of a war that turned out as planned.

Went to see Flag of Our Fathers this weekend.

 

One of the thing that I took from the movie was the message that the US citizens had turned on FDR and the war. It had gone on too long, too many lives lost and they were beginning to want out. And then the picture of Iwo Jima and the war bond tour began. The Heroes of Iwo Jima.

 

One scene in a hotel room and the Sec of Treasury told the 3 surviving members of the flag raising picture that they needed $14 billion ("that million with a b," I liked that line) was needed in this war bond tour to pay the bills of the war. And the previous 3 war bond tours did not add up to that figure.

 

The public support of the war had changed and the country was losing it's stomach of being in the war.

 

And if ANY war ever was justified, WWII would be it.

Serious question and if you want to respond with partisan answers please use the time in your life for something else.

 

I am not clear on the more soldiers argument. How would more soldiers prevent road side bombs, suicide bombers or the kidnapping/killing of Iraqi citizens? If we were fighting a conventional army, I see that. But when you look at a crowd of 100 and there are 40 terrorists in the crowd that look identical to the 60 that are not, I don't understand how another 100,000 soldiers are going to help this?

Serious question and if you want to respond with partisan answers please use the time in your life for something else.

 

I am not clear on the more soldiers argument. How would more soldiers prevent road side bombs, suicide bombers or the kidnapping/killing of Iraqi citizens? If we were fighting a conventional army, I see that. But when you look at a crowd of 100 and there are 40 terrorists in the crowd that look identical to the 60 that are not, I don't understand how another 100,000 soldiers are going to help this?

 

The opportunity for the biggest benefit from having more soldiers may have come and gone several years ago when the Saddam regime initially collapsed.

 

1) More soldiers would have been able to more effectively seal off Iraqi borders from Iran and Syria, believed to be major sources of foreign fighters that have fortified the insurgency.

 

2) More soldiers would have been better able to police the population centers during the power vacuum that occured when it became obvious that Saddam and his military were no longer in charge. The widespread looting, destruction of infrastructure, and revenge killings that took place during these early days could have been more effectively contained with more coalition forces on the ground.

 

3) It has been reported that U.S. forces cannot permanently secure population centers because there aren't enough soldiers to clear and hold all areas simultaneously. Our forces go into a city, clear out the insurgents, and then have to move on to another area to do the same. When this happens, the insurgents move back in and set up shop. Any locals who are supportive of the U.S. occupation cannot show their support for fear of reprisal when U.S. forces leave and insurgents/militias move back in.

 

4) More soldiers would have been able to secure weapons caches left unguarded when the Iraqi military dissolved. Instead, many of these weapons were seized by the local population (including those unfriendly to U.S. forces) and are now being used to kill our own troops and wage sectarian violence. Ask yourself: where are all of the mortar rounds being used for IED's coming from? They're either coming from looted weapons caches or from across the border (see #1 above). Either way, more U.S. forces would have gone a long way toward starving the insurgency of its firepower.

 

5) More soldiers would have been able to ensure the basic security needed to ensure that reconstruction projects and the vital economic activity they provide could progress without harassement in the form of attacks and retribution killings. One of the main problems in Iraq today is the economic one of unemployment created by the security problem.

 

These are just a few that easily come to mind. I invite those who would disagree to offer their arguments.

The opportunity for the biggest benefit from having more soldiers may have come and gone several years ago when the Saddam regime initially collapsed.

 

1) More soldiers would have been able to more effectively seal off Iraqi borders from Iran and Syria, believed to be major sources of foreign fighters that have fortified the insurgency.

 

2) More soldiers would have been better able to police the population centers during the power vacuum that occured when it became obvious that Saddam and his military were no longer in charge. The widespread looting, destruction of infrastructure, and revenge killings that took place during these early days could have been more effectively contained with more coalition forces on the ground.

 

3) It has been reported that U.S. forces cannot permanently secure population centers because there aren't enough soldiers to clear and hold all areas simultaneously. Our forces go into a city, clear out the insurgents, and then have to move on to another area to do the same. When this happens, the insurgents move back in and set up shop. Any locals who are supportive of the U.S. occupation cannot show their support for fear of reprisal when U.S. forces leave and insurgents/militias move back in.

 

4) More soldiers would have been able to secure weapons caches left unguarded when the Iraqi military dissolved. Instead, many of these weapons were seized by the local population (including those unfriendly to U.S. forces) and are now being used to kill our own troops and wage sectarian violence. Ask yourself: where are all of the mortar rounds being used for IED's coming from? They're either coming from looted weapons caches or from across the border (see #1 above). Either way, more U.S. forces are required if we are to have any hope of starving the insurgency.

 

These are just four that easily come to mind. I invite those who would disagree to offer their arguments.

Thank you very much for the information and more importantly the tone of your reply.

 

1) I understand the thought process behind this but when you look at that we cannot control our own borders not sure if this thought is reasonable. I understand that it SHOULD be, but when your look at what goes on in on own country at the Mexico border, not sure we would have met with a tremendous amount of success. Some yes, slowed it down probably, done it, no. I guess slowing it down would be the best we could have hoped for and probably better than it is now.

 

2) Considering our police forces cannot reasonable stop this in our US cities, at one time there was more murders in Detroit than US soldiers being killed in Iraq (I remember reading that somewhere) again I don't think that would be as simple as it sounds. I also question whether our forces are trained or capable of being true police forces. Not sure that our forces are capable of that and be effective.

 

3) I would worry that too many soldiers and we would really look like an occupying force and the government of Iraq even more so relies on the US forces.

 

4) I agree wholeheartedly that making sure these caches of weapons should have been a focus of the US military.

 

I am not sure that more soldiers is the answer. Any country in this situation, does it not take years (10-15) to truly become a stable country?

Do you have link to the declassified documents. The AP story seems pretty vague on details. Anybody familiar with Iraq could have predicted the difficulties cited in the stories. Considering the light casualties suffered in the "hot" war, it seems that 400,000 troops were not needed. I would like to see how the actual document's casualty estimates compare to the actual ones. My guess is that they were much higher, otherwise the AP and CNN would have mentioned them.

 

I found links to the declassified documents:

 

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB207/index.htm

 

and

 

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB207/index.htm#documents

 

Two of the quotes from the document titled, "Desert Crossing After Action Report, June 28, 1999" that I thought were particularly prescient:

 

"How do we re-establish civil order in the wake of combat operations? Sustaining peace often requires more complex planning and sophisticated intervention techniques than do combat operations. If there are severe disruptions of the infrastructure that impede normal government services, if food and drinking water cannot be distributed, if reconstruction progress does not provide incentives to refrain from renewing hostilities, or if minorities perceive that the social system will not protect them, then peace may be lost." Page 28/38

 

"Regime change may not enhance regional stability. It often seems that Saddam Hussein is the source of all instability in the Gulf region. However, Iraq in Saddam's wake is likely to be unstable and this instability may spread if not properly managed. For example, Iraq's neighbors may seek to take advantage of this period of uncertainty. Or, the country could fragment along religious and/or ethnic lines. Or, internal forces could create domestic and regional chaos as they bid for power. Each of these will adversely affect regional stability and may require a U.S.-led response. Even when civil order is restored and borders are secured, the shape and type of the post-Saddam regime could be problematic--especially if perceived as weak or out-of-step with the prevailing structure of neighboring governments. The presence of a government that may be more representative (i.e. democratic) in its decision-making functions than any of its neighbors may invite the conduct of subversive activities in Iraq. Neighboring regimes will also be concerned with any catalyzing effect on their own pro-democracy movements. In a sense, a western-style democracy may not engender long term stability without considerable stabilization, preparation, and long-term sustainment. Political-military planners developing courses of action for U.S. response shouls not ignore these potential outcomes nor should they assume that Saddam's departure will mark a new period of regional stability." Page 10/38

 

Another very interesting twist to this whole thing is the one of the Principals in the war game simulation was none other than General Anthony Zinni, then commander of U.S. Central Command. Zinni participated in this war game, understood the risks and pitfalls of an Iraq invasion and occupation that were foretold, and later came out with harsh criticism for Donald Rumsfeld and the lack of planning and grossly inadequate U.S. forces for the aftermath of the invasion. To read Zinni's thoughts on the botched post-invasion planning, check out the following interview:

 

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/05/21/60minutes/main618896.shtml